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I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Salerno,' several courts have recently subjected
Rule 804(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence to exacting scrutiny.
The defendants in Salerno asked the court to admit under Rule 804(b)(1)
the grand jury testimony of two witnesses who refused to testify at trial.2
Initially, the federal prosecutor called the two witnesses to testify about
the existence of a bid-rigging scheme in the concrete industry in New
York before the grand jury under a grant of immunity. When questioned
by the government, the witnesses denied any involvement in or knowl-
edge of a bid-rigging scheme.' At trial, when the government attempted
to prove that such a scheme existed, the defendants called the two grand
jury witnesses to the stand to weaken the government's theory. How-
ever, the witnesses refused to testify, invoking the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. 4 Because a properly asserted privi-
lege renders a declarant "unavailable" under Rule 804(a)(1),5 the
1. 937 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2503, remand 974 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1992),
vacated on reh'g en banc sub nom. United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909 (2d cir .1993).
2. Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) provides:
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(1) Former Testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the
same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in
the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the
testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in
interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct,
cross, or redirect examination.
3. United States v. Salerno, 112 S. Ct. 2503, 2506 (1992).
4. Id. Because the government's grant of immunity applied only to testimony before the
grand jury, the witnesses had not waived the right to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination.
5. Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in
which the declarant-
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defendants looked to Rule 804(b)(1), arguing that grand jury testimony
constituted admissible "former testimony."6
Rule 804(b)(1) represents an exception to the exclusion of hearsay.7
The rule explicitly states that former testimony is not excluded by the
hearsay rule "if the party against whom the testimony is now offered...
had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by
direct, cross, or redirect examination."'
In Salerno, the district court judge excluded the grand jury testi-
mony because she found that the government lacked the requisite "simi-
lar motive" to develop the testimony in the two proceedings.' On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ini-
tially ruled that the "similar motive" prong of the Rule should "evapo-
rate" in circumstances where the defendant in a criminal trial wishes to
admit grand jury testimony of witnesses who have invoked the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination."° The Second Circuit
reasoned that the witnesses were "available" to the government through
a grant of immunity." "The 'similar motive' requirement of rule
804(b)(1) protects the party to whom the witness is 'unavailable' in
order to accord that party some degree of adversarial fairness ....""
Because the Second Circuit perceived the witnesses as "available" to the
government in these narrow circumstances, the court viewed adversarial
fairness as superceding the "similar motive" requirement. t3
The Supreme Court rejected the Second Circuit's conclusion that
the defendants did not have to demonstrate a "similar motive" to fall
under Rule 804(b)(1). The Court reversed and remanded the case for
further consideration of the government's "similar motive" under Rule
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying
concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the declarant's
statement despite an order of the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's statement;
or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then
existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; ....
6. See infra part III.
7. FED. R. EvID. 802 ("Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by
other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of
Congress.").
8. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(1).
9. United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 804 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2503 (1992).
10. Id. at 806.
11. Id. "[T]he government's argument that it lacked the opportunity and similar motive to
develop the testimony in front of the grand jury is irrelevant, because the declarants were not
similarly unavailable to the government at trial." Id. at 808.
12. Id. at 806.
13. Id.
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804(b)(1). 4 On remand, the Second Circuit fully considered the argu-
ments by both parties and found that a "similar motive" existed. 15 How-
ever, on rehearing en banc the Second Circuit vacated its finding of
similar motive and held that the district court properly excluded the
grand jury testimony of the two witnesses. 6
This Note discusses the precedential value and the significance of
the interpretation of Rule 804(b)(1) by the Second Circuit and the
Supreme Court in United States v. Salerno. Part II traces the history of
the case. Part III examines Rule 804(b)(1) and the different interpreta-
tions given by the courts. Part IV explores the Second Circuit's applica-
tion and analysis of Rule 804(b)(1) in Salerno. Finally, Part V proposes
that courts should adopt the "reasonable examiner" approach when eval-
uating whether "similar motive" exists under Rule 804(b)(1). Such an
objective approach should be adopted to preserve the core element of the
rule: adversarial fairness.
II. THE UNFOLDING OF THE CASE
United States v. Salerno has a long and complex history.' 7 This
enormous case involved bid-rigging in the concrete industry in New
York.' 8 The thirty-five count grand jury indictment charged the "Geno-
vese Family" with using its influence over labor unions and its control
of the concrete supply to rig bidding on construction projects.' 9 The
14. United States v. Salerno, 112 S. Ct. 2508, 2509 (1992).
15. United States v. Salerno, 974 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1992).
16. United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 915 (2d Cir. 1993).
17. The case began in 1987 with a thirty-five count indictment against eleven defendants.
United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 800-01 (2d Cir. 1991). Because of the complexities, this
Note presents an abbreviated summary of the relevant background.
18. Prior to the indictment in this case, a shorter Racketeering Influenced Corrupt
Organization Act (RICO) trial transpired in the Southern District of New York embodying many
of the same facts. That trial, known as the "commission" case, "alleged a RICO enterprise known
as the 'commission' of La Cosa Nostra." Id. at 800. The indictment alleged that the commission
functioned as the definitive governing body over five New York families known as the "La Cosa
Nostra" families (Genovese, Gambino, Colombo, Lucchese and Bonanno). Id.
The alleged activities of the commission included promoting and organizing "joint ventures
of a criminal nature involving the families." Id. One alleged commission scheme was the
concrete contractors' "club." In this scheme, only commission-approved concrete companies
could take New York City concrete construction contracts worth more than two million dollars.
Such a contractor would then be required to pay two percent of the contract price to the
commission. Id.
19. Id. at 801-02. This case came to be known as the "construction" case. Id. at 801. Count
One charged eleven defendants (Anthony Salerno, Vincent DiNapoli, Louis DiNapoli, Nicholas
Auletta, Edward Halloran, Alvin 0. Chattin, Aniello Migliore, Matthew lanniello, John
Tronolone, Milton Rockman, and Richard Costa) with a pattern of racketeering activity in
contravention of the RICO conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). Id. Count Two charged all
eleven defendants with the "substantive crime of conducting and participating in the activities of
the Genovese family in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (the substantive RICO count)." Id.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Family dispersed these contracts to a purported "Club" of concrete com-
panies in exchange for a share of the proceeds.2"
A significant portion of the case at trial involved the affairs of one
of the "Club" members, the Cedar Park Concrete Construction Corpora-
tion.2 ' During the grand jury proceeding, the government called two of
the owners of Cedar Park, Pasquale Bruno and Frederick DeMatteis, to
testify under a grant of immunity. Bruno and DeMatteis testified but
repeatedly denied any participation in the Club.22 When the government
tried to show at trial that Cedar Park had belonged to the Club, the
defendants countered by calling Bruno and DeMatteis to testify.23 On
the stand, both Bruno and DeMatteis invoked the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and refused to testify. 24 Accord-
ingly, the defendants asked the district court to admit the transcripts of
the witnesses' grand jury testimony under Rule 804(b)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.25
The district court refused to admit the testimony, holding that the
United States did not have a "similar motive" to develop the testimony
at the grand jury proceeding as it would have had at trial.2 6 In reversing
the district court's decision,27 the Second Circuit noted that concerns
about reliability and accuracy are absent when the "defendant wishes to
introduce the grand jury testimony that the government used to obtain
his indictment .... -28 The government has all the advantages before the
grand jury, and the proceedings are inherently unfavorable to the interest
of defendants. 29 Because "Rule 804(b)(1) incorporates considerations of
"Counts Three through Thirty-Five charged various of the defendants with mail fraud, conspiracy,
extortion, illegal gambling, and extortionate credit extension." Id.
20. Id. at 802.





26. Id. The trial judge "reasoned that the government's motive to examine a grand jury
witness is 'far different from the motive of a prosecutor in conducting the trial.' " United States v.
Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 804 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd 112 S.Ct. 2503 (1992) (citation omitted).
27. Although sixteen issues were raised on appeal, the Second Circuit concluded that the
exclusion of the grand jury testimony "so tainted the entire trial that reversal and a new trial is
required for all eight appealing defendants." Salerno, 937 F.2d at 804.
28. Id. at 807 (emphasis omitted). The Second Circuit found that the witnesses were
available to the government at trial by a grant of immunity. Because the witnesses were only
"unilaterally unavailable" and the government could have cross-examined them, the court
refrained from endorsing exclusion of the testimony on the basis of fairness to the government.
Id.
29. Id. Consider the following factors present at grand jury proceedings that favor the
government over defendants: "the ex parte nature of the proceeding, the leading questions by the
government, the absence of the defendant, the tendency of the witness to favor the government
because of the grant of immunity, [and] the absence of confrontation." Id.
[Vol. 48:323
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adversarial fairness into the evidentiary analysis,"3 a defendant should
be able to enter testimony against the government from a grand jury
proceeding that favors the government and is inherently adverse to the
defendant, without having to prove a "similar motive."3 If the govern-
ment wanted the witnesses to testify, it could have granted immunity to
the witnesses at trial.
The Supreme Court, adhering to a strict textual interpretation,
found error in the Second Circuit's application of Rule 804(b)(1) and
reversed and remanded the case. 32 The Supreme Court held that each
element of Rule 804(b)(1), including the "similar motive" element, must
be satisfied before former testimony can be entered in evidence. 33 Jus-
tice Thomas noted that by enacting twenty-nine exceptions to the hear-
say rule,34 Congress made a deliberate decision regarding what should
constitute acceptable exceptions to the general prohibition against
admission of hearsay under Rule 802. 35 The Court further noted it must
respect Congress's decision and enforce the language it enacted.36 In
remanding the case, the Supreme Court left to the Second Circuit the
determination of whether the government had a "similar motive" to
develop the testimony of the two grand jury witnesses.37
On remand, the Second Circuit applied the evidentiary standards
announced by the Supreme Court and found that the government did
have a "similar motive" as required under Rule 804(b)(1) and "that the
district court abused its discretion by refusing to admit the grand jury
testimony of witnesses Bruno and DeMatteis. ' 38 In late 1992, the Sec-
ond Circuit granted a rehearing on the issue of whether the government
had a "similar motive" to develop the testimony. 39
In November 1993, the Second Circuit vacated its prior ruling and
held that the government did not have a "similar motive" at the grand
30. Id. at 806 (quoting United States v. Vigoa, 656 F. Supp. 1499, 1505 (D.N.J. 1987)).
31. Id. In contrast, it would clearly be unfair for the government to enter grand jury
testimony against a defendant who had no part in developing the testimony.
32. United States v. Salerno, 112 S. Ct. 2503, 2509 (1992).
33. Id. at 2507.
34. Twenty-four exceptions are found in Rule 803 while five exceptions are found in Rule
804 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. FED. R. EVID. 803, 804.
35. Salerno, 112 S. Ct. at 2507.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 2509.
38. United States v. Salerno, 974 F.2d 231, 232 (2d Cir. 1992).
39. "Rehearing inbanc is granted, limited to the issue . . . [of] whether with respect to
Frederick DeMatteis and Pasquale Bruno, the Government had at trial a 'similar motive to develop
the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect testimony,' within the meaning of Fed. R. Evid.
804(b)(1), compared to the motive it haad [sic] at the grand jury." United States v. Salerno,
Docket No. 88-1464 (2d Cir. Nov. 25, 1992) (order granting rehearing as to "similar motive").
19931
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jury proceeding and at trial." In reaching its decision to vacate, the
court explained that the
proper approach . . . in assessing similarity of motive under Rule
804(b)(1) must consider whether the party resisting the offered testi-
mony at a pending proceeding had at a prior proceeding an interest of
substantially similar intensity to prove (or disprove) the same side of
a substantially similar issue. The nature of the two proceedings -
both what is at stake and the applicable burden of proof - and, to a
lesser extent, the cross-examination at the prior proceeding - both
what was undertaken and what was available but forgone - will be
relevant though not conclusive on the ultimate issue of similarity of
motive.4
The dissent argued that the en banc majority applied a gloss to the lan-
guage of Rule 804(b)(1) that effectively rewrites the rule from "similar
motive" to "same motive."42
III. RULE 804(B)(1)
Both plaintiffs and defendants usually prefer live testimony over
former testimony, but witnesses are not always available at the time of
trial.43 Rule 804(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides a hear-
say exception that addresses such situations."
Before a declarant's former testimony can be admitted into evi-
dence, Rule 804(b) imposes a threshold requirement that the declarant
be "unavailable." This requirement of "unavailability" safeguards fair-
ness concerns. "Because former testimony is in actuality some other
proceeding's evidence ... it appears to be fundamentally fair to admit it
only when better evidence is unavailable. '45 Although it failed to define
40. United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 910 (2d Cir. 1993).
41. Id. at 914-15 (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 916 (Pratt, J., dissenting).
43. Witnesses may disappear, die, or even refuse to testify by claiming a Fifth Amendment
privilege.
44. See supra note 2. Drafters of Rule 804(b)(1) extensively debated its content. Ultimately,
Congress enacted a version of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) that varied from the rule the
Supreme Court promulgated. Glen Weissenberger, The Former Testimony Hearsay Exception: A
Study in Rulemaking, Judicial Revisionism, and the Separation of Powers, 67 N.C. L. REV. 295,
298-99 (1989). The Supreme Court's original version of this rule only required that "some litigant
at a former hearing have had a similar motive, interest, and opportunity to develop the testimony."
Id. at 299.
The Rule as adopted also includes the term "predecessor in interest" for application in civil
cases. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). Congress's inclusion of the terms "predecessor in interest"
reflects a consideration of the fairness concerns in admitting former testimony in civil cases.
Recognizing that former testimony of an unavailable witness cannot be cross-examined at trial,
Congress placed significant weight on the fairness of entering the testimony. Weissenberger,
supra note 43, at 302.
45. Weissenberger, supra note 44, at 302.
[Vol. 48:323
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certain phrases in Rule 804(b)(1), Congress expressly listed the condi-
tions that constitute "unavailability" in subsection (a).4 6 Courts have
consistently found that where a Fifth Amendment privilege is properly
asserted by a witness, the unavailability requirement of Rule 804 is
satisfied.47
Once the "unavailability" threshold is met, the requirements of sub-
section (1) of Rule 804(b) must then be satisfied. Courts vary in their
interpretations of two phrases in subsection (1): "[tlestimony given as a
witness at another hearing" and "opportunity and similar motive to
develop the testimony."
In United States v. Donlon,48 the First Circuit found that grand jury
testimony does not fall within the definition of "testimony" under Rule
804(b)(1). 49 The court in Donlon said the Advisory Committee's note to
Rule 804(b)(1) excluded grand jury testimony because cross-examina-
tion is not "potentially available."5 This interpretation by the First Cir-
cuit blatantly ignores the actual language of the rule. By limiting the use
of Rule 804(b)(1) only to those situations where "cross-examination" is
available, the First Circuit improperly restricted the rule. The literal
words of Rule 804(b)(1) allow former testimony where the party against
whom the testimony is offered had an "opportunity and similar motive to
develop the testimony by direct, cross or redirect examination." During
grand jury proceedings, the government has broad latitude to develop
testimony by direct examination. 1
Although the Donlon court stated that prior grand jury testimony
does not fall under Rule 804(b)(1), it upheld the district court's decision
to admit the grand jury testimony of the defendant's wife under Rule
804(b)(5), the "catch-all" exception. 2 The First Circuit placed signifi-
46. See supra note 5.
47. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 990 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1993) (acknowledging that an
individual who refuses to testify under the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is
deemed unavailable); United States v. Taplin, 954 F.2d 1256, 1258 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting that
"[t]he predicate of unavailability is satisfied" where at trial a witness invokes his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination); United States v. Bahadar, 954 F.2d 821, 828 (2d
Cir. 1992) (stating that "[w]hen a Fifth Amendment privilege is properly asserted by a trial
witness, that witness becomes 'unavailable' for purposes of rendering potentially applicable all of
the hearsay exceptions described in rule 804(b)").
48. 909 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1990).
49. Id. at 653-54.
50. Id. at 654. In evaluating the limitations of the former testimony rule, the court held that
the Advisory Committee made "clear that exception one was written in respect to those kinds of
proceedings for which cross-examination was potentially available; and, grand jury proceedings
do not fall within that category." Id.
51. See supra note 29.
52. Donlon, 909 F.2d at 654-55.
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cant weight on the corroborating evidence in the record.-3  Subse-
quently, the Sixth Circuit noted in United States v. Gomez-Lemos54 that
the Supreme Court effectively overruled Donlon with its decision in
Idaho v. Wright.
5"
Other courts have recognized that grand jury testimony does fall
under Rule 804(b)(1). In United States v. Henry,56 a district court held
that grand jury testimony offered against the party that developed the
testimony may be offered in evidence under Rule 804(b)(1). 57 Similarly,
the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Klauber"8 wrote, "We can well
imagine that the district judge might have admitted the Grand Jury testi-
mony under Rule 804(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence."59 Rather
than simply speculating that grand jury testimony "may" be admitted as
evidence, the court in United States v. Miller6" ordered a new trial where
the district court denied defense counsel's motion to admit the grand
jury testimony of an "unavailable" witness.6
By far the most nebulous part of Rule 804(b)(1) is the "opportunity
and similar motive" requirement. Because Congress left these phrases
undefined, courts may vary in their interpretations of the meaning of the
words. Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, an
"opportunity" under the "unavailable witness rule" had to be "full, sub-
stantial and meaningful in view of the realities of the situation."62
Accordingly, prior testimony would be inadmissible at common law
where there was a "naked opportunity" to cross-examine, without a sub-
53. Id. at 655. The evidence supporting the grand jury testimony included the following: The
defendant's wife told the grand jury 1) where the defendant was living-at trial the defendant's
lease was entered as evidence to support that testimony; and 2) that the defendant had other guns
in the house-at trial a police officer noted that the defendant had himself admitted to having guns
in the house. Id. at 654-55.
54. 939 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1991).
55. 497 U.S. 805 (1990). In Wright, the Court noted that "[h]earsay statements admitted
under the residual exception ... do not share the same tradition of reliability that supports the
admissibility of statements under a firmly rooted hearsay exception." Id. at 817. Rather than
placing weight on corroborating evidence to satisfy the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment, the "'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' " must "be drawn from the
totality of circumstances that surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant
particularly worthy of belief." Id. at 820 (citation omitted).
56. 448 F. Supp. 819 (D.N.J. 1978).
57. Id. at 821.
58. 611 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1979).
59. Id. at 516.
60. 904 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
61. Id. at 66.
62. United States v. Franklin, 235 F. Supp. 338, 341 (D.D.C. 1964) (holding that the
government in a criminal trial may not admit the prior testimony of a co-defendant, given in his
own behalf, where the defendant had a naked opportunity, but no real need or incentive, to
thoroughly cross-examine his then co-defendant.). See also MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 804(b)(1) (3d ed. 1991).
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stantive need or incentive to do S0. 6 3
Under Rule 804(b)(1), the courts have recognized a difference
between "an opportunity for effective cross-examination" and "cross-
examination that is effective."" Whether or not a party conducts a full
cross-examination may depend on factors such as discovery, trial tactics,
and the nature of the proceeding. In the early stages of discovery, a
party may not possess sufficient information to conduct an effective
cross-examination of a witness. That situation seemingly differs from a
party's strategic decision to limit cross-examination. For example, the
lack of effective cross-examination would not preclude the admissibility
of the former testimony where a party had the opportunity to develop the
prior testimony but chose to limit the examination of the witness as a
part of trial strategy. Depending on the court's interpretation of "oppor-
tunity," even a decision at a preliminary hearing to forego cross-exami-
nation or a decision to restrict questioning at a deposition can be
extremely risky. If a witness becomes "unavailable" at the time of trial,
these forms of testimony may be entered as former testimony under Rule
804(b)(1). This factor is an important twist for lawyers to consider
when formulating trial strategies. 65
The importance of the consideration is underscored in United States
v. Pizarro.6 6 In Pizarro, the defendants, Pizarro, Rodriguez, and Lara,
were charged with selling heroin to Drug Enforcement Administration
agents working undercover.67 At the first trial, all three defendants were
convicted of the charges, but the Seventh Circuit reversed the convic-
tions and ordered a new trial because the prosecutor's closing arguments
included prejudicial remarks.68 At the second trial, the jury again con-
victed the defendants, but, because the district court judge's comments
to the jury after it convicted Lara and Rodriguez may have unintention-
ally induced a verdict against Pizarro, the district court itself declared a
mistrial as to Pizarro. 69 During the second trial, Rodriguez testified and
exculpated Pizarro by identifying another man as the source of the her-
63. Franklin, 235 F. Supp. at 341.
64. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739 (1987) (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S.
15, 20 (1985)); see also, United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559 (1988); United States v.
Salim, 855 F.2d 944, 953 (2d Cir. 1988).
65. Defendants choosing to represent themselves must also be cognizant of the twists. In fact,
an adequate opportunity for cross-examination has been deemed afforded to an accused who was
not represented by counsel at a preliminary hearing, but who questioned the witness herself. See
People v. Hunley, 21 N.W.2d 923, 924-925 (Mich. 1946).
66. 717 F.2d 336 (7th Cir. 1983).
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7in.
7° Pizarro was again convicted at the third trial.7 At the third trial,
when Rodriguez refused to testify, Pizarro offered Rodriguez's testi-
mony from the second trial as former testimony under Rule 804(b)(1).
7 2
The district court denied the admission of Rodriguez's testimony,
concluding that the government had been unable to fully develop Rodri-
guez's identification testimony.73 The Seventh Circuit reversed and
ordered a new trial because it found that the government had a "mean-
ingful and real" opportunity to establish on cross-examination that Rod-
riguez was lying in his identification testimony during the second trial. 4
The government could not subsequently exclude Rodriguez's testimony
by claiming it failed to fully develop the testimony because Rule
804(b)(1) "incorporates a concept of fairness" by "requiring only an
opportunity and motivation. ' 75 The Seventh Circuit also rejected the
government's argument that it could not inquire into a death threat
against Rodriguez.76 The Seventh Circuit found that the government
had the opportunity to pursue such line of questioning but thereby
refrained, placing a self-imposed restriction that precluded a lack of
opportunity argument.77
Some courts have found that an "opportunity" exists in situations
that facially appear to be "naked opportunities. '78 The most troubling
"naked opportunity" situation is the preliminary hearing. Frequently, at
the time of a preliminary hearing, both the defendant and the govern-
ment are in the early stages of preparing their cases. The preliminary
hearing has been characterized as "a truncated proceeding conducted in
a relatively informal manner at the conclusion of which there can only
be a finding of 'probable' cause as contrasted with the establishment of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."79 But an accused faced with the pos-
sibility of having preliminary hearing testimony entered at a subsequent




74. Id. at 349.
75. Id. at 349 (citing 1 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
804(b)(1)[02] (1982)).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 349-50.
78. In his dissent in Salerno, Justice Stevens cited the following cases to illustrate situations
where courts have found opportunity and similar motive: "Glenn v. Dallman, 635 F.2d 1183,
1186-87 ([6th Cir.] 1980) (identification testimony of eyewitness at preliminary hearing
admissible against defendant at trial even though defendant declined to cross-examine the witness
fully) .. .United States v. Zurosky, 614 F.2d 779, 791-93 ([1st Cir.] 1979) (suppression hearing
testimony of co-defendant which inculpated defendant admissible against defendant at trial even
though defendant declined to cross-examine co-defendant at the hearing)." United States v.
Salerno, 112 S. Ct. 2503, 2511-12 n.7 (1992).
79. State v. Mee, 632 P.2d 663, 675 (Idaho 1981) (Shepard, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 48:323
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trial under Rule 804(b)(1) must be "thoroughly prepared at the prelimi-
nary hearing."" ° If the accused fails to fully cross-examine a witness,
the prosecution could constructively use the preliminary hearing to
develop "affidavits" that could potentially serve as evidence in a subse-
quent trial.81 This would necessitate investigation and suppression
motions prior to the hearing.82 In liberally allowing the admission of
preliminary hearing testimony under Rule 804(b)(1), courts have failed
to consider the "realities" of the situation and ignored the adversarial
fairness underpinnings of Rule 804(b)(1). 83
The words "similar motive" connote a flexible concept. Because
the Supreme Court has not defined this element of Rule 804(b)(1), the
courts of appeals have been left to establish their own standards. In a
civil action, the Ninth Circuit held that "similar" is not synonymous with
"identical. '84 The Sixth Circuit concluded that "[t]he traditional formu-
lation of the similar motive requirement is that the two proceedings must
reflect a 'substantial identity of issues.' ",85 The identity of issues
requirement ensures that the opposing party had incentive and a pur-
poseful opportunity to cultivate testimony when first offered.86 In
United States v. McDonald,87 the Fifth Circuit went so far as to recog-
nize the possibility of admitting testimony from a prior civil case against
the government in a later criminal case.88
80. Id. at 676.
81. Without cross-examination by the defense, the prosecution could frame questions and
elicit answers to create testimony in the form of an "affidavit."
82. Mee, 632 P.2d at 676. Having extensive preliminary hearing proceedings would conflict
with the policy of granting preliminary hearings early to protect the rights of the accused. Id. at
675.
83. The "realities" referred to include the early stage of preparation as well as the nature of
the preliminary hearing. The preliminary hearing is a precursory proceeding not meant to fully
duplicate the events of a trial. If investigation is not complete at the time of the preliminary
hearing, it is contradictory to suggest that a defendant had an adequate "opportunity" for cross-
examination.
84. Murray v. Toyota Motor Distribs., Inc., 664 F.2d 1377, 1379 (9th Cir. 1981).
85. United States v. Taplin, 954 F.2d 1256, 1259 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting 8 JAMES W. MOORE
ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 804.04[31 (2d ed. 1989)).
86. See United States v. Wingate, 520 F.2d 309, 316 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1074 (1976). Obviously a party's incentive would differ if the issue at a prior proceeding
involved a misdemeanor, yet a subsequent trial involved a capital felony. The same would be true
for a case involving property damage of $500 as compared to that of $1,000,000.
87. 837 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir. 1988).
88. Id. at 1292-93 ("If a party in a civil case and the government in a later criminal case have
sufficiently similar incentives to develop the testimony, we see no reason to conclude that the rule
is necessarily and always unavailable to a criminal defendant."). The McDonald court embraced
the following factors enumerated by the Seventh Circuit: "1) the type of proceeding in which the
testimony is given, 2) trial strategy, 3) the potential penalties or financial stakes, and 4) the
number of issues and parties." Id. at 1292 (citing United States v. Feldman, 761 F.2d 380, 385
(7th Cir. 1985) (quoting Zenith Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190, 1252
(E.D.Pa. 1980))).
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The District of Columbia Circuit in United States v. Miller 9 found
that the district court abused its discretion by excluding the admission of
grand jury testimony at trial. The Miller court saw no reason why the
government's position at the trial should differ from its position before
the grand jury.9" The "similar motive" of the government at both pro-
ceedings related to the guilt or innocence of the defendants.91
The Second Circuit acknowledged in United States v. Wingate
92
that the government may have dissimilar motives in different proceed-
ings. In Wingate, the court held that the government did not have a
similar motive to cross-examine the witness because the issue at the sup-
pression hearing involved the voluntariness of a confession, while the
issue at trial was the guilt or innocence of the defendant.93 The former
testimony that the defendant sought to admit in United States v. Salerno
was grand jury testimony. A unique situation emerges where the gov-
ernment is the only party that developed the grand jury testimony and
also is the party against whom the former testimony is offered.
IV. SALERNO: An Analysis
A. Immunity and Unavailability in the Context of Adversarial
Fairness
In that Salerno involves the admissibility of grand jury testimony
under Rule 804(b)(1), the first inquiry must consider whether the wit-
nesses were "unavailable."94 "Unavailability" under Rule 804(a) is sat-
isfied when a witness properly invokes the Fifth Amendment.9 5 Both
Bruno and DeMatteis invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege at trial,
but the Second Circuit raised some questions about their "unavailability"
to the government under the circumstances of the case. The Second Cir-
cuit regarded the fact that the government could have made the wit-
nesses available by granting immunity as a pivotal element.96
The Second Circuit found the situation in Salerno particularly
troubling because the government developed the former testimony
through a grant of immunity yet refused to grant immunity at trial
89. 904 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
90. Id. at 68 n.3.
91. Id. at 68.
92. 520 F.2d 309 (2nd Cir. 1975).
93. Id. at 316.
94. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
96. United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 806 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2503,
remand 974 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1992), vacated on reh'g en banc sub nom. United States v.
DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909 (2d Cir. 1993).
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because the testimony favored the defense.97 The Second Circuit
acknowledged that the government is not required to grant use immu-
nity, but the court felt that the government did have a choice. 98 The
government could have prevented admission of the. grand jury tran-
scripts by allowing the witnesses to testify under a grant of immunity.99
Alternatively, once the grand jury testimony had been admitted, the gov-
ernment could have 1) immunized the witnesses and questioned them
about their testimony at the grand jury; or 2) not immunized the wit-
nesses and waived the right to further live questioning) °°
The government's failure to grant immunity to the witnesses at trial
can be viewed as a trial strategy that does not preclude the admission of
the former testimony. Similar to the risk borne by a defendant who
decides to limit cross-examination of a witness at a prior proceeding, the
government bears a risk in deciding whether or not to immunize a wit-
ness at trial to prevent the admission of former testimony. As the Sec-
ond Circuit recognized, the government is not required to grant
immunity in any situation, but the government should have to live with
the ramifications of its decision on this issue. t01
The Second Circuit also deemed the government's actions troubling
because "after identifying Bruno and DeMatteis as exculpatory wit-
nesses under Brady, the government then sought to make it impossible
for the defendants to obtain the exculpating testimony."'' 0 2 The court
even said that it would be a "semantic somersault" for the government to
claim that it met the Brady obligation while simultaneously preventing
the defendants from using or acquiring the evidence.103 But the Second
Circuit did not rest its decision on Brady,"° instead basing the ruling on
its interpretation of Rule 804(b)(1). t05
B. "Similar motive" in Salerno
The Second Circuit initially ruled that, in the interest of adversarial
97. Id. at 809.
98. The government in fact had already made a choice by initially immunizing the two
witnesses during the grand jury proceedings. The Second Circuit felt that "[t]o make a similar
choice at trial is not too great a burden to cast on the government." Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 808.
101. In Salerno, the consequence of the government's failure to grant immunity would be the
admission of the grand jury testimony. Id.
102. Id. at 807. The Court in Brady held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material ......
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
103. Salerno, 937 F.2d at 807.
104. The court yielded to the "time-honored rule" that constitutional issues should not be
reached unless absolutely necessary. Id.
105. Id.
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fairness, the "similar motive" element of Rule 804(b)(1) should "evapo-
rate" in the circumstances of Salerno.106 The Supreme Court did not
agree with that construction of Rule 804(b)(1), and, adhering to a strict
textual reading of Rule 804(b)(1), reversed and remanded the case to the
Second Circuit for application of the "similar motive" test.'0 7 The
Supreme Court rejected the argument that "adversarial fairness may pro-
hibit suppression of exculpatory evidence produced in grand jury pro-
ceedings."' 10 8 The Court failed to see how it could create an exception to
Rule 804(b)(1) and still be consistent with the plain language of the
rule." Because "similar motive" is not defined in the Federal Rules of
Evidence, the phrase must be read with regard to its "plain meaning." '110
On remand, the Second Circuit presented a detailed analytical
review of Rule 804(b)(1) in the context of the circumstances in
Salerno." The Second Circuit began its analysis on remand by defin-
ing the terms "similar" and "motive." The court defined "similar" as
"having characteristics in common" or "comparable" and "motive" as
"something within a person ... that incites him to action."' 112 The Sec-
ond Circuit noted that, consistent with its previous cases dealing with
the "similar motive" requirement of Rule 804(b)(1), the first inquiry in
determining similarity of motive considers whether what actually tran-
spired at the prior proceeding parallels what would take place at the
current proceeding. 1 3 If that inquiry is not definitive, the court should
then apply an objective analysis to determine whether a "reasonable
examiner under the circumstances would have had a similar motive to
examine the witness."
' 14
Consistent with its decision on remand, the Second Circuit on
rehearing en banc noted that in determining whether similarity of motive
exists, the nature of the proceedings and the cross-examination will be
106. Id. at 806.
107. United States v. Salerno, 112 S. Ct. 2503, 2509 (1992).
108. Id. at 2508.
109. Id.
110. The Supreme Court has clearly stated that when terms are not defined in the Federal Rules
of Evidence, courts must give them their "plain meaning," unless such meaning would lead to a
preposterous or unconstitutional result. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509-10
(1989); see also Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 178-79 (1987).
111. United States v. Salerno, 974 F.2d 231, 237-40 (2d Cir. 1992). Prior to the promulgation
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Supreme Court recognized that in interpreting the rules of
court, courts should consider the circumstances of the case. Fallen v. United States, 378 U.S. 139,
144 (1964). Yet in Salerno, the Supreme Court applied a strict statutory interpretation of a
Federal Rule of Evidence.
112. Salerno, 974 F.2d at 238 (citing WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1475, 2120 (1971)).
113. Id. at 239.
114. Id.
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relevant.115 The court recognized that "[tihe situation is not necessarily
the same where the two proceedings are different in significant respects,
such as their purposes or the applicable burden of proof."'1 16  "The
inquiry as to similar motive must be fact specific."' "17
In one respect this objective analysis coincides with the concept of
not precluding the admission of former testimony by trial strategies
invoked for that sole purpose. Yet the Second Circuit also seems to
suggest that where a "reasonable examiner" would not have examined
the witness, the former testimony will not be allowed in evidence.' 18
This Second Circuit opinion has opened the door for a reasonable rather
than strict interpretation of Rule 804(b)(1). Such an approach reflects a
respect for the adversarial fairness core of the rule.
The importance of this "reasonable examiner" standard and its
impact on the current state of the law can best be illustrated by applica-
tion to specific cases. The clearest example involves preliminary hear-
ing testimony. In Glenn v. Dallman,"9 the district court allowed the
preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness into evidence at
trial.' 20  At a trial hearing to determine the admissibility of that testi-
mony, defendant's counsel testified that "her cross examination of [the
witness] at the preliminary hearing was narrow in scope, that it was con-
ducted solely for the purpose of discovery with limited opportunity for
preparation .... -121 Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit held that defense
counsel has the opportunity for unlimited cross-examination at prelimi-
nary hearings. 122 Under a "reasonable examiner" standard, such a broad
generalization would not suffice. The witness' testimony would be
115. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
116. United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1993). Consider the impact of the
Second Circuit's holding in the context of civil proceedings. In the situation where a plaintiff
deposes a defense witness, the defense attorney may not have a motive to cross-examine her own
witness. If that witness becomes unavailable at the time of trial, that deposition should not be
admitted as evidence under the Second Circuit's holding. The deposition of a defense witness by
the plaintiff may represent a significantly different proceeding than the testimony of the witness at
trial. Additionally, the defense attorney may lack the requisite "similar motive" to cross-examine
her own witness.
117. Id. at 914.
118. The Second Circuit hinted at this view in an earlier case. In United States v. Serna, 799
F.2d 842, 849-50 (2d Cir. 1986), the Second Circuit excluded the admission of former testimony
where the "prosecutor had no real motive to fully explore [the witness'] earlier statements." The
Second Circuit clarified its decision in Serna by rejecting the notion that Serna "implies that lack
of similar motive may be established simply because questioning available at a prior proceeding
was not undertaken." United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 914 n.5 (2d Cir. 1993).
119. 635 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1980).
120. Id. at 1184.
121. Id. at 1187.
122. Id. at 1185-86 (comparing Havey v. Kropp, 458 F.2d 1054 (6th Cir. 1972), with the
district court's opinion).
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inadmissible at trial if a "reasonable examiner" would have conducted
similarly limited cross-examination for discovery purposes only. 23 The
"reasonable examiner" standard safeguards the adversarial fairness con-
cerns of Rule 804(b)(1).
The "reasonable examiner" standard does not impose an undue bur-
den on a party seeking to admit former testimony. Instead, it preserves
adversarial fairness by focusing on the actual circumstances of the case
and ensuring that the parties have a "similar motive" and a valid oppor-
tunity for effective cross-examination. t2 4 In United States v. McClel-
lan, 2 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to admit
the defendant's deceased ex-wife's testimony from a prior bankruptcy
proceeding.126 The defendant argued that the cross-examination at the
prior proceeding was not " 'vigorous' enough to challenge the witness'
credibility."'' 2 7  The court rejected this argument as misconceived
because the query involved in Rule 804(b)(1) concerns the underlying
motive-not the "vigorousness" of the cross-examination.' 28 The record
supported the fact that millions of dollars were at stake in the bankruptcy
proceeding, and the defendant's credibility suffered because of his ex-
wife's testimony. Accordingly, the court determined that sufficient
motive existed for the defendant to impeach his ex-wife. 129 Applying
the "reasonable examiner" standard to McClellan would most likely
result in the same conclusion. At the bankruptcy proceeding, with mil-
lions of dollars at stake, a "reasonable examiner" would have had a
strong motive to discredit the defendant's ex-wife. Consequently, even
under a "reasonable examiner" standard, the testimony of the deceased
ex-wife would be admissible under Rule 804(b)(1). By applying this
standard, courts could promote adversarial fairness without undergoing
drastic change.
30
123. In applying the "reasonable examiner" standard, courts should consider factors such as the
stage of the proceedings. Barring strategic tactics, cross-examining a witness in the early stages of
the case would be less effective than cross-examining a witness after completing a full
investigation. Courts should not apply the same standards for these two different situations.
124. The Second Circuit understood that, in addressing the question of "opportunity," it had to
decide whether the "opportunity was a 'meaningful' one, affording 'full and fair' examination
which 'thoroughly test[s]' the validity of the witnesses' testimony." United States v. Salerno, 974
F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1992).
125. 868 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1989).
126. Id. at 215. At the time of the trial, the defendant's wife had a brain tumor, which
impaired her memory and reasoning. She died before the appeal was decided. Id. at 214.
127. Id. at 215.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Adopting the "reasonable examiner" standard dictates that courts may have to make an
extra effort to apply a practical reality hindsight. Although the results in cases may not always
differ even with this hindsight, the fairness inherent in the "reasonable examiner" standard
justifies the extra effort.
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In rehearing Salerno en banc, the Second Circuit noted that
we do not accept the position ... that the test of similarity of motive
is simply whether at the two proceedings the questioner is on the
same side of the issue. The test must turn not only on whether the
questioner is on the same side of the issue at both proceedings, but
also on whether the questioner had a substantially similar interest in
asserting that side of the issue.'31
A questioner will not be deemed to have a similar motive at two
proceedings where a fact is pivotal to a cause of action at a second pro-
ceeding but merely peripherally related to a separate cause of action at a
first proceeding.132 Using the grand jury context as an example, the Sec-
ond Circuit explained how the nature of proceedings affects the inquiry
as to similar motive.
133
If a prosecutor is using the grand jury to investigate possible crimes
and identify possible criminals, it may be quite unrealistic to charac-
terize the prosecutor as the "opponent" of a witness's version. At a
preliminary state of an investigation, the prosecutor is not trying to
prove any side of any issue, but only to develop the facts to determine
if an indictment is warranted.'
34
The low burden of proof (probable cause) at the grand jury stage
does not presumptively create a motive to challenge an "opponents" tes-
timony. In DiNapoli, the Second Circuit found that two independent
circumstances dispelled similarity of motive by the government.
135
First, the grand jury had already indicted the defendants and no
putative defendant existed for whom probable cause was in issue. 136 In
his dissent, Judge Pratt expressed concern about the majority's
acceptance of and reliance on the prosecutor's assertions that he
already had an indictment against the defendants, that no new defend-
ants were being contemplated at the time these witnesses were
examined, and that, as a result, probable cause was not even an issue
before the grand jury when Bruno and DeMatteis were testifying.,
37
If that were true, Judge Pratt's concern is that the prosecutor improperly
used the grand jury as a discovery device to develop mere evidence on
an indictment he already had. 138 The law is well settled in the Second
Circuit and elsewhere that " '[ilt is improper to utilize a grand jury for
the sole or dominating purpose of preparing an already pending indict-
131. United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 912 (2d Cir. 1993).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 913.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 915.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 916.
138. Id.
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ment for trial.' 139 The government had an interest in investigating fur-
ther to determine if there might be additional defendants, but it had not
interest in showing the falsity of the witness's denial of the Club's
existence. 140
Second, the court found the record clearly showed that the grand
jurors had indicated to the prosecutor their disbelief of the denial. 4 1 The
court acknowledged that "[a] prosecutor has no interest in showing the
falsity of testimony that a grand jury already disbelieves."'
' 42
The Second Circuit acknowledged its inclination toward the "rea-
sonable examiner" standard by recognizing that certain factors distin-
guish the grand jury context from the trial context, but not accepting the
position, urged by the Government upon the Supreme Court, that a pros-
ecutor "generally will not have the same motive to develop testimony in
grand jury proceedings as he does at trial."'14 3 The court noted that "the
inquiry as to similar motive must be fact specific, and the grand jury
context will sometimes, but not invariably, present circumstances that
demonstrate the prosecutor's lack of a similar motive." 44
The concern over courts finding "opportunities" in "naked oppor-
tunties" 145 evaporates with the application of the reasonable examiner
standard. The Second Circuit has explicitly stated that the nature of the
proceedings is a relevant factor in determining opportunity and similar
motive. 
46
C. The Supreme Court and a "Similar Motive" Test
Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on the interpretation
of Rule 804(b)(1), lower courts have applied the Rule with varying
results. 4 7 The trial judge in Salerno excluded the testimony of Bruno
and DeMatteis, asserting that, generally, motives underlying questioning
139. Id. (citing In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated January 2, 1985 (Simels), 767




143. Id. at 913-14.
144. Id. at 914.
145. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., United States v. Donlon, 909 F.2d 650, 653-54 (1st Cir. 1990) (interpreting the
804(b)(1) Advisory Committee Note as not intending Rule 804(b)(1) to apply to grand jury
testimony because cross-examination is not available, and the exception was written for those
proceedings); United States v. Salim, 855 F.2d 944, 954 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding criminal
defendant's opportunity for effective cross-examination is satisfied if defense is given "full and
fair opportunity" to delve into and unmask the infirmities of testimony through cross-
examination); Murray v. Toyota Motor Distribs., Inc., 664 F.2d 1377, 1379 (9th Cir. 1982)
(holding motive need not be identical, only "similar").
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before the grand jury differ from motives underlying questioning during
trial. 4 Other courts have recognized that the government may have
similar motives when questioning witnesses before the grand jury and at
trial. 149
The Supreme Court did not address the "similar motive" in Salerno
because the Second Circuit had not addressed that element. 50  Indeed,
the Court probably was concerned about the possible ramifications of
establishing a "similar motive" definition. If the Court were to adopt a
strict interpretation of the "similar motive" requirement, such a test
could significantly impact any party's ability to enter former testimony
into evidence t"' by allowing trial strategies to play a part in preventing
the admission of former testimony. A strict construction might also
make it easier for parties to demonstrate that their "motives" at trial were
not similar to those at the prior hearing. Such a construction would
likely hurt the government more than the defense, because the govern-
ment frequently is the party desiring to use former testimony in criminal
cases. Thus, a strict construction would contradict the Court's proclivity
favoring the prosecution.152 On the other hand, a liberal construction of
the "similar motive" requirement might violate a party's right effectively
to examine a witness. Rather than formulate a standard, the Supreme
Court presently appears to prefer to let the courts of appeal "kick" the
rule around further.1
5 3
148. The district judge stated that "the 'motive of a prosecutor in questioning a witness before
the grand jury in the investigatory stages of a case is far different from the motive of a prosecutor
in conducting the trial.' " United States v. Salerno, 112 S. Ct. 2503, 2506 (1992).
149. See, e.g., United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d 512, 516-517 (4th Cir. 1979) (recognizing
that grand jury testimony may be admissible against the government, where the government had
the full right to interrogate at grand jury proceedings and, during trial, could call the witness to the
stand and immunize him for the purposes of cross-examination); United States v. Henry, 448 F.
Supp. 819, 821 (D.N.J. 1978) (finding that the defendant may offer in evidence grand jury
testimony against the government).
150. Salerno, 112 S. Ct. at 2509.
151. Rule 804(b)(1) has been used by both the prosecution/plaintiff and the defense to enter
various types of former testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Donlon, 909 F.2d 650 (1st Cir.
1990) (allowing the government to bring in incriminating grand jury testimony of a woman who
invoked spousal immunity at trial); United States v. Miller, 904 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(allowing the admission of grand jury testimony against the government); Mainland Indus., Inc. v.
Standal's Patents Ltd., 799 F.2d 746 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (allowing the jury to view video tape
deposition was not an abuse of discretion).
152. The Rehnquist court has been characterized as "pro-prosecution" and distrustful of
criminal defense attorneys. Jay Sterling Silver, Equality of Arms and the Adversarial Process: A
New Constitutional Right, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1007, 1041 (1990).
153. The Fifth Circuit has stated its preference for the Seventh Circuit's "similarity of motive"
test. United States v. McDonald, 837 F.2d 1287, 1292 (5th Cir. 1988). In McDonald, the Fifth
Circuit listed the following factors as those promoted by the Seventh Circuit in considering the
"similar motive" test with respect to testimony in civil proceedings being used in criminal
proceedings: " '(1) the type of proceeding in which the testimony is given, (2) trial strategy, (3)
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V. CONCLUSION
The dominant policy underlying the precise boundaries of Rule
804(b)(1) is adversarial fairness.t 54 Because our judicial system is an
adversarial one, federal courts' rulings should represent the underpin-
nings of an adversarial system. An equitable interpretation and applica-
tion of Rule 804(b)(1) requires considerations of adversarial fairness.
Yet, as evidenced in Salerno, the Supreme Court views the requirement
of applying the "plain meaning" of the rule as superseding concerns of
adversarial fairness.
The courts should modify the application of Rule 804(b)(1). The
Second Circuit has opened the door to a possible formulation of Rule
804(b)(1) that would promote adversarial fairness, while satisfying the
Supreme Court's requirement of applying the "plain meaning" of the
Rule. The "reasonable examiner" standard satisfies the Supreme Court's
strict interpretation requirement because it fits well within the nebulous
meaning of Rule 804(b)(1)'s "opportunity and similar motive" lan-
guage, yet respects the adversarial fairness underpinning the Rule.
While such a standard requires subjective analysis, and courts may be
hesitant to adopt a standard encouraging the application of practical real-
ity, hindsight fairness concerns should outweigh the effort required by
the courts to apply this standard.
JUDITH M. MERCIER
the potential penalties or financial stakes, and 4) the number of issues and parties.' " Id. (quoting
United States v. Feldman, 761 F.2d 380, 385 (7th Cir. 1985)).
154. Weissenberger, supra note 44, at 302.
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